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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
most zealous in its protection of the wife's marital rights. The hus-
band may be compelled to answer not only to his wife, but to the
state, 51 and even to total strangers 52 where he is remiss in the per-
formance of his legal obligations. The Ingstrum decision, however,
may be significant of a new attitude which the courts will adopt in
their jurisdiction over "non-support" cases. If sustained, the case may
influence further judicial opinion to the extent that third-party actions
against the husband will be curtailed entirely. The thought that the
husband is entitled to choose the persons with whom his wife has
pledged his credit is not without merit and is appealing to one's sense
of justice and fair dealing. It would seem more appropriate that the
wife secure a judicial separation wherein her maintenance is provided
for, rather than be permitted to pledge indiscriminately her husband's
credit with persons who, very conceivably, he might object to.
Strangers who deal with a wife should do so on her own credit, or if
she is believed to be financially irresponsible, should not extend credit
at all. It should be noted that this new application of the law would
be valid only in those instances where the spouses have separated by
consent. There is no doubt as to the right of an abandoned spouse
to pledge her husband's credit. We do not believe that the legisla-
ture would sanction a proposal to abolish third-party actions against
the husband, but it is not entirely improbable that courts will by the
weight of judicial decree relieve the husband of this not infrequent
nuisance.
RAYMOND J. MARGLES.
STATUTORY LIMITATION FOR FRAUD ACTIONS.
One of the outstanding problems that confront us in a consid-
eration of the Statute of Limitations may be stated thus: Does the
statutory period in actions founded in fraud run from the time of
the perpetration of the fraud or the discovery thereof?'
The New York Legislature had apparently solved this problem
by the clear and unmistakable wording of Section 48, subdivision 5,
of the New York Civil Practice Act.2 The decision in Brick v. Cohn-
'See note 7, supra.
'See note 27, supra.
IBALLANTINE, LIMITATIONS (1829) 86 n.1; BANNING, LImITATION OF
AcriONs (3d ed. 1906) 2; Troup v. Smith Ex'rs, 20 Johns. 43 (N. Y. 1822) ;
Leonard v. Pitney, 5 Wend. 30 (N. Y. 1830) ; First Mass. Turnpike Corp. v.
Field, 3 Mass. 201 (1807).
'N. Y. CIV. PRAC. AcT § 48, subd. 5, "The following actions must be com-
menced within six years after the cause of action has accrued: * * * Any action
to procure a judgment on the ground of fraud. The cause of action in such
a case is not deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the plaintiff, or the
person under whom he claims, of the facts constituting the fraud." (This
section will hereafter be referred to as the fraud Statute of Limitations.)
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Hall-Marx,3 however, created a state of confusion. Briefly stated, the
holding in that case is to the effect that in an action for fraud and
deceit based on a fraudulent breach of contract, the Statute of Limi-
tations in contract actions rather than tort actions controls, and the
limitation is measured from the date of the breach of contract and
not from the date of the discovery thereof. The case raises two fun-
damental problems: first, whether or not a fraudulent breach of con-
tract gives rise to a tort action for fraud and deceit; second, is the
fraud Statute of Limitations 4 inoperative until the discovery of the
fraud? This note considers these two problems.
I.
The fundamental principle underlying any judicial system is to
afford every individual an equal opportunity to remedy the wrongs
inflicted upon him. Under the common law, there was no set period
of time within which these grievances were required to be legally
adjusted.5 A fixed period, however, became a necessity as civilization
became more complex. Therefore, beginning with the reign of Henry
I, a series of statutes were passed which were in form the same as
our own Statute of Limitations.6
These statutes were designed not to confer substantive rights 7
but rather to set an arbitrary limit within which causes of action
must be commenced." The legislatures, in establishing these so-called
8276 N. Y. 259, 11 N. E. (2d) 902 (1937).
'Id. at 263, 264, 265, 11 N. E. (2d) at 903, 904; see note 2, supra.
37 C. J. (1925) 686; Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U. S. 487 (1879);
Wilcov v. Fitch, 20 Johns. 472, 475 (N. Y. 1823) (" * * * by the common law
there was no stated or fixed time as to the bringing of actions."); People v.
Gilbert, 18 Johns. 228 (N. Y. 1820) ; Rouss v. Ditmore, 122 N. C. 575, 30 S. E.
335 (1898) ; Ireland v. McIntosh, 22 Utah 296, 61 Pac. 901 (1900) ; Johnson
v. Merritt, 125 Va. 162, 99 S. E. 785 (1919).
636 C. J. (1925) 697, § 6, "* * * Statutes similar to (21 James c. 16),
although with varying modifications, now exist both in England and in the
different jurisdictions of this country."
The New York Statute of Limitations is contained in N. Y. CirV. PRAC.
Act §§ 10-60; see also Gilmore v. Ham, 142 N. Y. 1, 6, 36 N. E. 826, 827
(1894).
SCherrington v. South Brooklyn R. R., 180 App. Div. 659, 664, 168 N. Y.
Supp. 322, 325 (2d Dept. 1917) ; Hopkins v. Lincoln Trust Co., 115 Misc. 257,
260, 187 N. Y. Supp. 883, 885 (1921) ("Statutes of limitation are remedial
only. They in no manner partake of the nature of substantive law. They
regulate only the affairs of men."); Donovan v. Duluth St. Ry., 150 Minn.
364, 185 N. W. 388 (1921); Johnson v. Wynne, 64 Kan. 138, 67 Pac. 549
(1902). See note 34, infra.
I Matter of Tassell, 119 Misc. 478, 481, 196 N. Y. Supp. 491, 494 (1922);
Battle v. Shivers, 39 Ga. 405 (1869) ; Baker v. Kelly, 11 Minn. 480 (1866).
WOOD, THE LiuTATION OF AcTiONS (3d ed. 1901) 1, "The Statute of
Limitations are such legislative enactments as prescribed periods within which
actions may be brought upon certain claims, or within which, certain rights
may be enforced ;-and those statutes which merely restrict a statutory or
1938]
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reasonable periods, were guided by the "general experience of man-
kind,-that claims which are valid are not usually allowed 'to remain
neglected, and that the lapse of years without any attempt to enforce
a demand creates a presumption against its original validity or that
it has ceased to exist." 9
II.
Fraud is actual when an intent to deceive is present,10 or con-
structive, when this distinguishing characteristic-intent to deceive-
is lacking." The earliest statutory enactment involving the Statute
of Limitations in this connection included actual fraud, both at law
and in equity.12 The limitational period under this enactment was
held to operate from the discovery of the facts constituting the fraud.
This condition obtained until the passage of a revised statute in 1848
which limited the cases in which the Statute of Limitations would run
from the discovery of the fraud. Under this later enactment, the only
time the Statute would run from the discovery of the fraud was when
the suit was brought in equity and included no alternative legal re-
other right do not come under this head, but rather are in the nature of condi-
tions put by the law upon the right given."
BANNING, loc. cit. supra note 1: "The Statute of Limitations (it has been
said) are statutes of repose * * *." (Italics ours.) Semble, Shepherd v.
Thompson, 122 U. S. 231, 7 Sup. Ct. 1229 (1887); House v. Carr, 185 N. Y.
453, 78 N. E. 171 (1906); Dodds v. McColgan, 134 Misc. 518, 235 N. Y. Supp.
492 (1929), aff'd, 229 App. Div. 273, 241 N. Y. Supp. 584 (1st Dept. 1930) ;
Hart v. Goodly, 72 Misc. 232, 129 N. Y. Supp. 892 (1911); In re Schaffer,
53 Cal. App. 493, 200 Pac. 508 (1921); McWherter v. Cheney, 121 Ga. 541,
49 S. E. 603 (1904); Davis v. Munie, 235 I1. 620, 85 N. E. 943 (1908);
Bauerman v. Scharlott, 46 Kan. 480, 26 Pac. 1051 (1891); Fix v. Cook, 192
Ky. 731, 234 S. W. 453 (1921) ; Gebair v. Jones, 48 Utah 244, 158 Pac. 426
(1916) ; Betterman v. Cowley, 19 Wash. 207, 53 Pac. 53 (1898).
037 C. J. (1928) 685, §2; Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Fire Ins., 7 Wall.
386 (U. S. 1868); Buchanan v. Roland, 5 N. J. L. 721 (1819); Gautier v.
Franklin, 1 Tex. 732 (1847) ; see KELLEY, CODE OF LIMITATIONS (1903) (for a
study of the history of New York Statute of Limitations) ; PRASHKER, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON NEW YORK PLEADING AND PRACTICE (2d ed. 1937) c. I (for
a study of the cases and materials interpreting the present New York Statute
of Limitations).
"Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 255 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441 (1931);
Thayer v. Schelley, 137 App. Div. 166, 121 N. Y. Supp. 1064 (1st Dept. 1910);
Rose v. Goodale, 169 N. Y. Supp. 446 (1918) ; see note 11, infra.
4 Lamner v. Stoddard, 103 N. Y. 672, 9 N. E. 328 (1886); Spallholz v.
Sheldon, 216 N. Y. 205, 110 N. E. 328 (1915) ; Pitcher v. Sutton, 238 App. Div.
291, 264 N. Y. Supp. 488 (4th Dept. 1933), aff'd, 264 N. Y. 638, 191 N. E. 603
(1934).
N. Y. CODE CIv. PRoc. (1788) § 71, subd. 6 provides that "An action
for relief on the ground of fraud, the cause of action in such case is not to be
deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts
constituting the fraud."
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lief.13 In 1887 the effect of this section was broadened by an amend-
ment declaring that so long as the suit was brought in equity the limi-
tational period would be measured from the discovery of the fraud, in
spite of the fact that additional prayers for legal relief (e.g., money
judgment in addition to an accounting) were included. 14 Obviously,
this increased the number of cases in which the Statute could apply.
From 1848 until the passage of the modem statute in 19 2 0 ", there
was no specific provision for the limitation of fraud actions at law in-
cluded in the section, and in legal actions the time was measured from
the date of the perpetration of the fraud, rather than from the dis-
covery of the facts constituting it.16 In 1920 this result was allevi-
ated by the passage of Section 48, subdivision 5, of the Civil Practice
Act 17 which declared in effect that any action for fraud runs from
the discovery thereof. The Lincoln Trust Co.' 8 case construed this
section to apply to actions at law as well as in equity and thus the
present-day effect of the Statute was attained.
Constructive fraud does not involve actual intent to defraud and
is a purely equitable result achieved by the courts to prevent injustice.
In these cases fraud is merely inferred and is not a constituent part
of the action as pleaded.' 9 Therefore, constructive fraud is not in-
cluded in Section 48, subdivision 5,20 which measures the period of
I N. Y. CODE Civ. PRoc. (1848) § 91, subd. 6 provides that "An action for
relief, on the ground of fraud; in cases which heretofore were solely cognizable
by the court of chancery; the cause of action in such case is not to be deemed to
have accrued, until the discovery by the aggrieved party, of the facts constitut-
ing the fraud." (Italics ours); Northrop v. Hill, 57 N. Y. 351 (1874).1 4N. Y. CODE Civ. PROC. (1848) § 91, subd. 6 was amended by the Laws
of 1877, c. 416, 422, to become part of REV. STAT. § 383, subd. 5 and provide
that "An action to procure a judgment other than for a sum of money on the
ground of fraud in a case which on the 31st day of December, 1846 was
cognizable by chancery. The cause of action in such a case is not deemed to
have accrued, until the discovery by the plaintiff or the person under whom he
claims of the facts constituting the fraud." (Later amended by the Laws of
1920, c. 199 to become § 48, subd. 5 of N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT [see note 2,
supra]); Carr v. Thompson, 187 N. Y. 160 (1881); Model Building and Loan
Ass'n v. Reeves, 236 N. Y. 331, 140 N. E. 715 (1923).
N . Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 48, subd. 5.
"a Ball v. Gerard, 160 App. Div. 619, 146 N. Y. Supp. 81 (1st Dept. 1914);
East River Nat. Bank v. Columbia Trust Co., 171 N. Y. Supp. 384, 385 (1918).
'See note 2, upra.
I Hopkins v. Lincoln Trust Co., 233 N. Y. 213, 215, 135 N. E. 267 (1922);
Note (1938) 12 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 317; Keys v. Leopold, 241 N. Y. 189, 193,
149 N. E. 828, 829 (1925): "When a legal and equitable remedy exists as to
the same subject-matter, the latter is under the control of the same statutory
bar as the former."; see Rundle v. Allison, 34 N. Y. 80 (1866).1
'Ericksen v. Quinn, 47 N. Y. 410 (1872); Cole v. Tyler, 65 N. Y. 73
(1875); Smith v. Reid, 134 N. Y. 568 (1892) ; see note 11, supra, and note
73, infra.
" Pitcher v. Sutton, 238 App. Div. 291, 293, 264 N. Y. Supp. 488, 491 (4th
Dept. 1933) ("In an action based on constructive fraud the ten year limitation
commences to run from the date when the act or omission constituting it
occurs, and not from the time when the facts constituting the fraud were
discovered. * * * The fraud which is referred to in this section is actual fraud
and not constructive fraud.") ; McKenzie v. Wappler Electric Co., 128 Misc. 827,
1938 ]
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limitation as running from the date of discovery of the facts consti-
tuting the fraud.2 ' The section which applies to suits in equity is
Section 53,22 the "catch-all" clause, which sets the period of limita-
tion as ten years in all cases not otherwise specifically enumerated.
This section has been held to make the limitational period applicable
from the perpetration rather than from the discovery of the fraud,
23
thus creating a distinction between actual fraud at law or in equity,
and constructive fraud in equity.
In this connection it may be noted that courts of equity will not
assist an individual in the perpetration of a fraud and will estop him
from "interposing the statute" of limitations "as a defense" where one
is guilty of fraudulent concealment in causing the Statute to run its
limits.2 4
To reiterate, at present the Statute of Limitations, in cases in-
volving constructive fraud, begins to operate from the time the fraud
is perpetrated,2 5 whereas in actual fraud the Statute begins to operate
from the time the facts constituting the fraud are discovered. 26
219 N. Y. Supp. 580 (1926), aff'd, 215 App. Div. 336, 213 N. Y. Supp. 389
(1st Dept. 1927) ; Hart v. Goodley, 72 Misc. 232, 129 N. Y. Supp. 892 (1911)
("The six year statute does not apply to causes of action in equity based on
constructive fraud.") ; see also Note (1938) 12 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 317.
Exkorn v. Exkorn, 1 App. Div. 124, 37 N. Y. Supp. 68 (1st Dept. 1896).
The fraud Statute of Limitations is limited to fraud actions and all other causes
of actions are excluded from its operation. For exceptions to this rule see
PRASHKER, loc. cit. "upra note 9.
2 1 Ibid.
N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 53 provides: "Limitation where none specifically
prescribed. An action, the limitation of which is not specifically prescribed in
this article must be commenced within ten years after the cause of action
accrues."
"Pitcher v. Sutton, 238 App. Div. 291, 264 N. Y. Supp. 488 (4th Dept.
1933), aff'd, 264 N. Y. 638, 191 N. E. 603 (1934) ("In an action based on
constructive fraud the ten year limitation [N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 53] com-
mences to run from the date when the act or omission constituting it occurs,
and not from the time when the facts constituting the fraud were discovered.").
'Dodds v. McColgan, 134 Misc. 518, 235 N. Y. Supp. 492 (1929), aff'd,
229 App. Div. 273, 241 N. Y. Supp. 584 (1st Dept. 1930). A note, given for
work, labor and services, could be enforced in a court of equity, although the
Statute of Limitations had run due to defendant's fraudulent concealment.
This is discussed in PRASHKER, op. cit. supra note 9, at 32; see also (1930)
29 Micx. L. REV. 117; House v. Carr, 185 N. Y. 453, 78 N. E. 171 (1906);
Lightfoot v. Davis, 198 N. Y. 261, 91 N. E. 582 (1910); Clark v. Gilmore,
149 App. Div. 445, 450, 133 N. Y. Supp. 1047, 1050 (1st Dept.) ("Where one
has obtained an advantage by fraud, equity will not permit him to hold it by
resorting to the Statute of Limitations"). But cf. Smith v. Troup's Ex'rs, 20
Johns. 43 (N. Y. 1822) ; Leonard v. Pitney, 5 Wend. 30 (N. Y. 1830) ; Fritts
v. Slade, 9 Hun 145 (N. Y. 1876). Contra: The First Mass. Turnpike Co. v.
Field, 3 Mass. 201 (1807) ; Murray v. Chicago N. W. Co., 92 Fed. 868 (C.
C. A. 8th, 1899) ; Boomer v. French, 40 Iowa 601 (1875) ; see note 8, supra.
I See note 23, supra.
Piper v. Hoard, 107 N. Y. 67, 13 N. E. 632 (1887) (When the statute
has commenced to run against such an action it is not suspended by the perpe-
tration of a new fraud) ; Decker v. Decker, 108 N. Y. 128, 15 N. E. 307
(1888) ; Miller v. Wood, 116 N. Y. 351, 22 N. E. 553 (1889) ; Gallup v. Bernd,
49 Hun 605, 1 N. Y. Supp. 478 (5th Dept. 1888) ; Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 241
[ VOL. 13
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The word "discovery" as used in the fraud Statute of Limitations
has been interpreted by the courts of New York to be synonymous
with the word "notice". 27 It is superfluous to reiterate that no indi-
vidual may blind himself to realities and still receive a court's protec-
tion. Courts are willing to protect the diligent, but refuse to protect
the negligent.28 Therefore, the Statute of Limitations in fraud ac-
tions starts to operate at the time one is put on "notice" of the facts
constituting the fraud.29 Whether or not an individual has been put
on "notice" is a question of fact to be answered by the jury, basing
its conclusion on all the evidence in the particular case.30 However,
if the facts are not in dispute, and only one interpretation can be
drawn therefrom, it becomes a question of law.3 ' The burden of prov-
ing freedom from "notice" is on the one alleging the fraud.3 2
III.
BRICK V. COHN-HALL-MARX
New York Rule: The present wording of Section 48, subdivi-
sion 5,33 referring to actual fraud and giving the period of limitation
as commencing from the discovery of the fraud presents no obvious
ambiguities and was interpreted with facility by the courts for more
than a decade. It remained for the case of Brick v. Cohn-Hall-Marx 3 4
to inject new confusion into the law by its interpretation of this sec-
App. Div. 510, 272 N. Y. Supp. 429 (1st Dept. 1934). For further list of cases
see 1 NIcHOLS-CAHILL, N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT (1937) 160, 161; Note (1938)
12 ST. JorN's L. REV. 317; see also note 63, infra.
I Talmadge v. U. S. Shipping Bd. Emergency Fleet Corp., 54 F. (2d) 240,
243 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932). Under § 48, subd. 5, N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT: "It is
enough * * * that the victim of fraud is put on notice of the practice upon him,
he need not know the full details." Gates v. Andrews, 37 N. Y. 657 (1868) ;
Kent v. Kent, 62 N. Y. 560 (1875); Decker v. Decker, 108 N. Y. 128, 1 N. E.
307 (1888); Weaver v. Haviland, 142 N. Y. 534, 535, 37 N. E. 641, 642
(1893) : "The time when the fraud was committed is not the period from which
the limitation is to be computed, but the tine when the plaintiff had acquired a
standing to assail it." (Italics ours.)
Campbell v. Culver, 56 App. Div. 591, 67 N. Y. Supp. 469 (4th Dept.
1900).
' See note 25, supra.
O'TooLE, LAW OF EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1937) c. 5, p. 133; GREENLEAF, LAW
oF EVIDENCE (15th ed. 1892) c. 1, p. 49; Stachers v. N. Y. Central R. R., 71
N. Y. 464 (1880); McDonald v. Metropolitan, 167 N. Y. 66, 60 N. E. 284(1901); People v. Walker, 198 N. Y. 329, 91 N. E. 806 (1910) ; Marshal v.
Seely, 49 App. Div. 433, 63 N. Y. Supp. 335 (1st Dept. 1900).
'Ibid.; Outhouse v. Baird, 121 App. Div. 556, 106 N. Y. 241 (2d Dept.
1907).
' Town of Venice v. Breed, 65 Barb. 597 (1873) ; Gaines v. Huyler, 113
Misc. 188, 184 N. Y. Supp. 145 (1920) ; for collection of cases see NICHOLs &
CAHILL, loc. cit. supra note 26.
' See note 2, supra.
s4276 N. Y. 259, 11 N. E. (2d) 902 (1937).
1938 ]
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tion. In this case the parties in interest entered into an agreement in
1924 whereby the defendant was to pay the plaintiff a certain per-
centage of the sales of a patented article in consideration of the re-
linquishment by the plaintiff of all claims to the patent. The defendant
then allegedly caused fraudulent books to be kept and the plaintiff,
as a result, received orily half of the royalties to which he was entitled.
This fraud the plaintiff claimed he did not discover for more than ten
years. Thereafter, he brought an action in fraud and deceit to re-
cover the damages caused by the defendant's alleged wrongdoing. The
defense interposed was the Statute of Limitations-specifically, Section
48, subdivision 1, of the Civil Practice Act.35 The question to be
adjudicated was under which section of the Statute of Limitations did
the present case fall? If it was to be regarded as subject to the
Statute of Limitations for fraud actions the plaintiff was entitled to
relief because the action was brought within six years after the plain-
tiff discovered the facts constituting the fraud. If, however, the action
was essentially one in contract it would be barred by the defendant's
act of pleading the Statute of Limitations since in such actions the
Statute begins to operate from the date of the breach of contract.3 6
The Appellate Division was unanimous in holding that this action
came within the confines of the fraud Statute of Limitations." The
Court of Appeals, too, was unanimous in holding that, "The basis of
the action is the contract. The claim of the plaintiff is based upon
the contract, * * *. Even though the defendant may have falsely
stated the amount of the sales and rendered false statements, the fact
remains that its liability on the actual amount of sales depends upon
the contract." 8 Thus the action was declared barred by Section 48,
subdivision 1.3'
The cause of action, as a result, has the unique distinction of
apparently having all the elements of a fraud action,40 and yet having
been called an action "based on contract".4' The court, however, was
not entirely without precedent in its ruling inasmuch as it followed
N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT. § 48, subd. 1 providing: "The following actions
must be commenced within six years after the cause of action has accrued:
1. An action upon a contract obligation or liability expressed or implied,
except a judgment or sealed instrument."
In a civil case, the Statute of Limitations must be pleaded in order that it
may be available as a defense. O'TooLE, op. cit. supra note 30, at 84.
N. Y. CIv. PRAc. AcT § 48, subd. 5, or N. Y. CIv. PRAc. Act. § 48, subd. 1.
'251 App. Div. 300, 301, 296 N. Y. Supp. 342, 344 (1st Dept. 1937) : "We
are inclined to the view that the statute [§ 48, subd. 1, N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr]
is not a bar to this action, which is predicated upon the theory of fraud pure
and simple ** * *. * * * we have concluded that the plaintiffs had pleaded facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action for fraud, * * *." (Italics ours.)
"276 N. Y. 259, 263, 11 N. E. (2d) 902, 903 (1937).
' See note 35, supra.
' EDGAR AND EDGAR, LAW oF ToRTs (3d ed. 1936) 178-187; Wasdell v.
Fosdick, 13 Johns. 325 (1815); Whitney v. Allire, 1 N. Y. 304 (1848); Urtz
v. N. Y. Central R. R., 202 N. Y. 170, 95 N. E. 711 (1911).
"Brick v. Cohn-Hall-Marx, 276 N. Y. 259, 11 N. E. (2d) 902 (1937).
[ VOL. 13
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Cart v. Thompson,42 which is cited for the proposition that "An alle-
gation of fraud was in no sense essential to 'cause of action' * * *;
it could stand without it; omitting every such allegation it could still
successfully defy a demurrer; it cannot be said to be founded on
fraud, when that element is not essential; the proof of fraud becomes
only necessary as to fit answer to a possible defense" and, therefore,
was an action based on contract.
43
It would seem, therefore, that as a result of this case, a fraudu-
lent breach of contract will not give rise to a tort action for fraud and
deceit.44 The rule laid down in the -Brick case apparently is limited
to cases where, (1) the contract is the crux of the fraud, (2) the
contract is valid, and (3) the plaintiff has a successful action on the
contract exclusive of the fraud.45
Majority Ride: The rule in other jurisdictions is at variance
with the rule as stated in the Brick case. These jurisdictions declare
that, "The test * * * is not whether the fraud * * * occurred in a
contract or independently of contract, but the test rather is whether
the action seeks relief from or on account of the fraud * * *" 46
It is to be noted that there is a class of adjudicated cases in these
states which in theory at least, favors the New York rule, since in
both instances the actions are held based on contract. However, a
distinguishing feature between these and the New York cases is
patent. In those actions involving an apparent similarity with the
New York rule, it is the defendant who is attempting to change the
cause of action from one in contract to one in fraud. The defendant
seeks to prove that the breach of contract was fraudulent. The rea-
son is obvious: Since the shorter fraud Statute of Limitations will
now apply, the plaintiff's action will be barred. Therefore, the plain-
-87 N. Y. 160 (1881), wherein an action by a principal to recover a certain
sum of money from his agent, who fraudulently concealed this sum by rendering
false accounts, was barred by the six-year Statute of Limitation (N. Y. Civ.
Ppac. Acr § 48, subd. 1), because this action was based on the contract and
not in fraud.
Brick v. Cohn-Hall-Marx, 251 App. Div. 300, 302, 296 N. Y. Supp. 342,
344 (1st Dept. 1937). The following distinction between this and" the Carr
case was made by Judge Glennon; i. e., "We are told that the case of Carr v.
Thompson, (87 N. Y. 160), controls. With that contention we cannot agree.
There, the action was based upon a breach of contract. Here, the gravamen
of the action is fraud." See also Korner v. Appel, 198 App. Div. 540, 190
N. Y. Supp. 619 (1st Dept. 1921); also, People v. Strauss, 155 Misc. 610, 281
N. Y. Supp. 200 (1935), for the same type of pleading. Contra: Jacobs v.
McGurk, 242 App. Div. 612 (1st Dept. 1934), aff'd without opinion, 267 N. Y.
601, 196 N. E. 600 (1935). But see Brick v. Cohn-Hall-Marx, 276 N. Y. 259,
11 N. E. (2d) 902 (1937), wherein it is stated: "The fact, however, is that
the point [in the Brick case] was not raised or considered in this Court, as no
ruling or exception permitted us to pass upon it." But cf. Ponozzo v. Carbo-
rundum, 7 F. Supp. 317 (W. D. N. Y. 1934) ; see note 64, infra.
Carr v. Thompson, 87 N. Y. 160, 165 (1881).
"See note 42, supra, and note 65, infra.
"5 Ibid.
" Hillock v. Idaho'Title & Trust Co., 22 Idaho 440, 126 Pac. 612, 616
(1912). See note 47, infra.
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tiff in these cases is permitted to choose between a fraud action or
an action based on contract.4 7
By contrast, the plaintiff under the New York rule is placed
under a decided disadvantage. This results from the fact that the
New York courts arbitrarily construe his action as one in contract. 48
And since in New York the Statute of Limitations, for both fraud
and contract, runs for six years, the Statute will run sooner on the
contract action because it begins to operate from the date of the breach
thereof.49 Whereas, if the plaintiff were permitted to bring his ac-
tion in fraud, the Statute would not run until he had discovered the
fraud. 50
Thus, from a practical viewpoint an individual within the jur-
isdiction of the New York courts has but a single remedy when a
contract is fraudulently breached-an action on contract 51-whereas
in other jurisdictions he has the optional remedies of either an action
on the contract or an action in tort, for fraud and deceit.
52
Basis of Conflict: The reason for the conflicting rules in this
connection is the fact that in cases of this type concurring legal prin-
ciples without any clear line of demarcation are involved. These ac-
tions include both fraud and contract elements and when courts are
faced with the choice of applying the rules of either of the two, there
is an understandable difference of opinion which gives rise to the con-
flicting rules in different states. The basic distinctions underlying
these conflicting rules are:
1. In pleading a cause of action the subject matter rather than
the form is the controlling factor. 3  This rule is strictly applied in
" Sandorell v. Randolph, 11 Ariz. 371, 95 Pac. 119 (1908) ; Boyer v.
Barrows, 166 Cal. 757, 138 Pac. 354 (1914); Murto v. Lemar, 19 Colo. App.
314, 75 Pac. 160 (1903); Gregory v. Williams, 106 Kan. 819, 289 Pac. 933
(1920); Hawk v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 83 Kan. 775, 777, 112 Pac.
602 (1911); Waldorf v. Ciolino, 13 La. App. 646, 127 So. 445 (1930); Ross
v. Saylor, 39 Mont. 559, 104 Pac. 864 (1909) ; Brown v. Logan, 20 Okla. 334,
95 Pac. 441 (1908) ; Clark v. Lund, 55 Utah 284, 184 Pac. 821 (1919) ; Missouri
Saving & Loan Co. v. Rice, 84 Fed. 131 (C. C. A. 8th, 1897) ; cf. Hall v.
Banker's Trust Co., - Colo. -, 74 P. (2d) 720 (1937) holding that the
plaintiff may recover certain moneys "which he alleges he paid only by reason
of alleged false representations. * * * Instead of affirming the original contract
and exercising his right to sue in tort the damages on account of injuries
sustained by such representations * * * declared a rescission and brought an
action ex contractuo to recover the payment he had made." This is due to the
fact that an action on implied contract accrued after the rescission. Therefore,
the action for money had and received will lie. Gibson v. Hanly, 131 Cal. 6,
63 Pac. 61 (1900). Contra: Murray v. Chicago R. R., 92 Fed. 868 (C. C. A.
8th, 1899) ; see Kirby v. Lake Shore, 120 U. S. 130, 7 Sup. Ct. 430 (1887).
" See note 42, supra; note 65, infra.
" See note 35, supra.
o See note 26, supra.
" See note 42, supra.
"See note 47, supra.
'Brick v. Cohn-Hall-Marx, 276 N. Y. 259, 11 N. E. (2d) 902 (1937);




the formulation of the New York doctrine. To quote from the Brick
case, 54 "To say that the complaint is framed in fraud and not upon
contract may be true in theory, but in applying the Statute of Limi-
tations we look for the reality and the essence of the action and not
the mere name." As a general proposition this is true in all states
where "code" forms 5 rather than "common law" 56 forms are used.
2. The majority rule outside of New York has the "election of
remedies" as its dominating principle.57  The doctrine as applied in
this connection has been very ably stated by Judge Sanborn thus:
"It is very frequently the case when a covenant is broken * * * [that
a fraud is committed] but one who breaks his agreement cannot de-
prive the other party to the contract of his right of action for the
breach by committing a breach and a fraud at the same time. In
such a case the injured party has a right of action for relief on the
grounds that the contract is broken, and a right of action for relief
on the ground of fraud, and the wrongdoer has not, but the injured
party has, the choice of remedies. He may bring his action for dam-
ages for the fraud, or he may waive the tort and sue on the contract." 58
In formulating our rule the New York courts have not only over-
looked the "election of reinedies" doctrine but have also refused to
take cognizance of two cardinal principles: First, "A tort may be de-
pendent upon or independent of contract. If a contract imposed a
legal duty upon a person, the neglect of that duty is a tort founded
on contract, so that an action ex contractu for the breach of the con-
tract or an action ex delicto for the breach of duty may be brought at
the option of the plaintiff." (Italics ours.) 59 Second, "The Statute
of Limitations is one of repose. It does not pay a debt or extinguish
* * * [a right] but merely bars the remedy by the form to which it
applies leaving available to the plaintiff every other lawful means for
realizing on the debt [or right]." 60
IV.
Effect of the New York Rule: The New York rule, as a result
of the Brick case, 61 is that a fraudulent breach of contract does not
- 276 N. Y. 259, 264, 11 N. E. (2d) 902, 904 (1937).
'McDonald v. Reich and Lievre, 110 Cal. App. 736, 281 Pac. 106 (1929);
Orezon v. McNeile, 103 Kan. 629, 175 Pac. 633 (1918).
r Bates v. Bates, 230 Ill. 679, 82 N. E. 911 (1907) ; see 114 A. L. R. 525.
See note 47, supra.
r'Missouri Savings & Loan Co. v. Rice, 84 Fed. 131 (C. C. A. 8th, 1897).
ADDISON, TORTS, p. 13, cited in Hillock v. Idaho Trust Co., 22 Idaho 440,
449, 126 Pac. 612, 616 (1912); Rich v. N. Y. Central, 87 N. Y. 382 (1881);
see notes 46, 47, spra.
'Dodds v. McColgan, 134 Misc. 518, 519, 235 N. Y. Supp. 492 (1929);
see note 24, upra.
"276 N. Y. 259, 11 N. E. (2d) 902 (1937).
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give rise to an action in tort for fraud and deceit. 2 The result is the
rather anomalous situation in which an action basically one in tort
is measured by the contract Statute of Limitations (operating from
the date of the breach of the contract). In addition, there remains
a class of cases involving only the question of fraud, without involving
the breach of a contract in which the Statute of Limitations runs from
the discovery of the facts constituting the fraud.6 3
It is obvious, therefore, that the Brick case," making an action
for the fraudulent breach of contract subject to the contract Statute
of Limitations is momentous. It apparently abolishes a substantive
right, i.e., a tort action for fraudulent breach of contract. To the ex-
tent that the tort remedy has been abolished, fraud may be commit-
ted with impunity. Thus, if an individual fraudulently breaches a
contract, and can successfully conceal the fraud for six years, then
the courts will protect him in his fraudulent scheme. Many cases
adjudicated since the Brick decision illustrate this point.65
The harsh effect of the rule in the Brick case may be amelio-
rated, in part at least, if a case falls into one of the following cate-
gories:
' See note 42, supra, and note 65, infra.
'Bosley v. Nat. Machine Co., 25 N. Y. St. Rep. 575, 6 N. Y. Supp. 4
(1889); Gates v. Andrews, 37 N. Y. 657 (1868); Kent v. Kent, 62 N. Y. 560
(1875) Fitts v. Beardsley, 55 Hun 603, 8 N. Y. Supp. 567 (5th Dept. 1889) ;
Coffin v. Barber, 155 App. Div. 713, 101 N. Y. Supp. 147 (4th Dept. 1906) ; Hall
v. Grays, 227 App. Div. 337, 238 N. Y. Supp. 67 (3d Dept. 1929) ; East River
Say. v. Barret, 23 Misc. 423, 52 N. Y. Supp. 81 (1898) ; cf. Exkorn v. Exkorn,
1 App. Div. 124, 37 N. Y. Supp. 68 (1st Dept. 1896) (this section [48, subd. 5,
N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT] is applicable to fraud actions exclusively); Slayback
v. Raymond, 40 Misc. 601, 83 N. Y. Supp. 15 (1903). Laches is not strictly
involved in pleading in this action. Campbell v. Campbell, 239 App. Div. 682,
268 N. Y. Supp. 789 (1st Dept. 1934), aff'd, 264 N. Y. 616, 191 N. E. 592
(1934), wherein it was held that the six-year statute of limitation does not
apply to annulment actions on the ground of fraud, but § 1139, N. Y. Civ.
PRAc. AcT applies. See note 26, supra.
o'276 N. Y. 259, 11 N. E. (2d) 902 (1937).
Drydock Knitting Mills, Inc. v. Queens Machine Corp., 254 App. Div.
568, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 717, 718 (2d Dept. 1938) : "An action to recover damages
for a breach of a written contract by which defendant agreed to build three
machines for plaintiff who agreed to purchase them at certain terms. The
fraludulent breach of contract does not give rise to an action for fraud."
(Italics ours.) Cook v. Schmidt, - App. Div. -, 5 N. Y. S. (2d) 34, 35 (1st
Dept. 1938) : "The Court properly held that the payment of $6000 per year under
so-called 'French' agreement, was not salary under the plaintiff's agreement with
defendant ** *. We think *** that this case cannot be distinguished in principle
from Brick v. Cohn-Hall-Marx, (276 N. Y. 259, 11 N. E. (2d) 902 (1937)).
The alleged fraud was not extraneous to the contract and did not change the
nature of the action from an action on the contract as alleged in the complaint,
to an action in tort for fraud." Quigg v. Neugass & Co., 254 App. Div. 710,
- N. Y. Supp. (2d) - (2d Dept. 1938), holding that in an action based on
alleged fraud in an employment contract, judgment dismissed. (The number
of cases decided on this point, since the Brick case, already equals the number
decided in the half century preceding the decision.)
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1. "Where the defrauded party was induced to sign the instru-
ment by false representations that it was an instrument of a different
sort, and he is blind, illiterate or could not read without his glasses,
and for that reason relied on the other party's representations as to
what the instrument was or contained, or where he read the instru-
ment himself but surreptitiously another instrument was substituted
for him to sign, there is said to be fraud in the execution and such
fraud renders the instrument void and not merely voidable." 66 There-
fore, in such cases, an individual cannot bring to a successful conclu-
sion an action based on the contract, and as a result actions based on
"fraud in the execution" of a contract do not come within the confines
of the rule in the Brick case.67
2. This rule does not apply to cases where there is merely fraud
in the inducement of the contract.68 The defrauded plaintiff who in
such an instance, commences a tort action for fraud and deceit, af-
firms the original validity of the contract and is barred thereby from
commencing a successful action on the contract by the doctrine of
"election of remedies". Such an action is entirely one in fraud and
involves no breach of contract. Therefore, the fraud Statute of Limi-
tations would apply and the case would not come in under the rule
in the Brick case.69
3. When fraud exists concurrently in the inducement and the
performance of the contract, the plaintiff has a right to bring a suit
in equity for rescission, thereby placing himself in status quo.70 No
doubt exists that an action for rescission comes within the provisions
of the fraud Statute of Limitations. 7
4. As to actions based upon fraud in the performance of a con-
tract, if the relationship is purely contractual, the possibilities are
very great that individuals are cautious enough to discover any breach
within the six years allowed by Section 48, subdivision 1.72 The case,
however, is exceptional where the relationship is purely contractual
and a trust relationship cannot be implied,-for as a general proposi-
tion a trust relationship can be implied by the courts where property
WHITNEY, LAW OF CONTRACTS (2d ed. 1934) 124, 125; Whipple v. Brown
Bros. Co., 225 N. Y. 237, 121 N. E. 748 (1916).
"Therefore, the third essential element of the rule in the Brick case, i.e., the
plaintiff must have a successful action on the contract exclusive of the fraud,
is lacking.
'lIbid.
'WILLISTON, LAW OF CONTRACTS (Rev. ed. 1937) §§ 1524-1531. The
plaintiff has, also, the choice of bringing an action for rescission. WHITNEY,
loc. cit. supra note 66.
o Ibid.
Higgins v. Crouse, 147 N. Y. 411, 42 N. E. 6 (1895); Bosley v. Nat.
Machine Co., 22 N. Y. St. Rep. 575, 6 N. Y. Supp. 4 (1889) ; Fittsv. Beards-
ley, 55 Hun 603, 8 N. Y. Supp. 567 (5th Dept. 1889) ; Slayback v. Raymond,
93 App. Div. 326, 87 N. Y. Supp. 931 (1st Dept. 1904).
1" See note 35, supra.
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has passed between the parties. 73  If a trust relationship is created,
Section 15 of the Civil Practice Act applies and the Statute is not
put in operation until a demand is made by the plaintiff.7 4
5. If the relationship is purely contractual the rule in the Brick
case 75 is broad enough to permit the plaintiff to recover. For, says
Chief Justice Crane, "If there were fraud extraneous to the contract,
* * * a different situation might arise. The plaintiff in such a case
would have a cause of action for damages caused by the fraud * * *." 76
6. Apparently fraud actions, based on the fraudulent performance
of an implied contract, would not come within the rule of the Brick
case.77 Because, "Under averments of * * * [such a] petition * * *
[one] must show fraud in order to be entitled to recover * * * " 78
Causes of action based on implied contracts, also, lend themselves to
trust and equitable actions, for the maxim, equity will not allow
an individual to keep what in good conscience does not belong to
him, 79 will apply.
7. The situation may arise where an accounting in equity is re-




8. Furthermore, although the parties have contractual duties, an
action for fraud and deceit can still be maintained if the plaintiff can
O'TOOLE, LAW OF TRUSTS (2d ed. 1935) § 77 states: "The absence of a
definition of fraud and the reason for its absence are now traditional. Fraud
remains undefined lest its definition defeat the purpose of equity to embrace all
over-reachings, conspiracies, and breaches of duty within its jurisdiction. In
cases of actual fraudulent intent, equity does not hesitate to declare a construc-
tive trust, in order that full and complete justice may be done. Cases frequently
arise, however, where there is no proof of actual fraudulent intent at the time
the transaction is entered into, but where equity will apply the constructive
trust theory to prevent what it characterizes as a constructive fraud."
Matter of O'Hara, 95 N. Y. 403 (1884); Wood v. Rabe, 96 N. Y. 414
(1884); Baker v. New York National Exchange Bank, 100 N. Y. 31, 2 N. E. 452
(1885): "The agent holds the goods and the proceeds upon an implied trust to
dispose of the goods according to the direction of the principal, and to account
for, and turn over to him the proceeds from sales." Amherst College v. Ritch,
151 N. Y. 282, 45 N. E. 876 (1897); Falk v. Hoffman, 233 N. Y. 199, 135
N. E. 243 (1922) ; Fur and Wool Trading Co. v. Fox, 245 N. Y. 215, 156 N. E.
670 (1927).
' N. Y. Crv. PRAc. AcT § 15.
276 N. Y. 259, 11 N. E. (2d) 902 (1937).
" Id. at 264, 11 N. E. (2d) at 904.¢276 N. Y. 259, 11 N. E. (2d) 902 (1937).
"Gard v. St. John, 122 Kan. 477, 252 Pac. 212, 213 (1927) ; see note 67,
suqpra.
See note 73, supra.
'0 Schantz v. Oabman, 163 N. Y. 148, 57 N. E. 288 (1900) ; Fur and Wool
Trading Co. v. Fox, 245 N. Y. 215, 217, 156 N. E. 670, 672 (1927), holding in
certain cases equity will entertain a suit for an accounting. "This is so where
such a relation exists between the parties as under established principles entitles
the one to demand it of the other."
" See note 22, supra.
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prove the essential elements of the tort without alleging the contract.8 2
(Neither rule, of course, will tolerate the ingenuity of any "sharp
practitioner" to escape the effect of the statute.) 3
The entire problem would be obviated if Section 48, subdivision
5,84 were amended to include, by specific reference, the action for
fraudulent breach of contract. In such case, it may read as follows:
Any action to procure a judgment on the ground of fraud, or
of fraudulent breach of contract. The causes of actions in such cases
are not deemed to have accrued until the discovery by the plaintiff, or
the person under whom he claims, of the facts constituting the fraud.
BENJAMIN BARTEL.
THE LAW OF THE CHARITABLE SUBSCRIPTION.
There has always been among men a concept of charity, but one
quite different from that known to the members of a modem, Chris-
tian, democratic state, for the concept of charity has grown with the
state and with the church so that today the courts are faced with un-
precedented problems, akin to, but different from, the problems of any
other age.
"The life of the law has not been logic, it has been experience." 1
In common law subjects, especially subdivisions of the law of con-
tracts,2 "a page of history is worth a volume of logic" a for "very
often the effect of history is to make the path of logic clear". There-
fore, to understand the law of charities in general and more espe-
cially the law of the charitable subscription, it is necessary to consider
briefly the growth of the concept of charity and its development.
Growth of the Concept of Charity.
Early and primitive charity was, like the primitive state, limited
first to the family and later to the tribe, but the intercourse between
' The rule in the Brick case does not apply because the first essential
element is lacking, i.e., the contract is the central theme of the fraud. See note
45, supra.
EDGAR AND EDGAR, loc. cit. supra note 40; (1937) 12 ST. JOHN'S L. Rav.
135, 136; see notes 26, 62, supra.
' Brick v. Cohn-Hall-Marx, 276 N. Y. 259, 11 N. E. (2d) 902 (1937);
Horowitz v. Horowitz, 132 Misc. 493, 230 N. Y. Supp. 139 (1920).
See Note, The Statute of Limitations for Malpractice (1938) 12 ST.
JoHN's L. REv. 330.
"See note 2, supra.
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881) 1.
'Mr. Justice Holmes in N. Y. Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U. S. 345, 349,
41 Sup. Ct. 506, 508 (1920).
'Holmes, The Path of the Law (1897) 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 465.
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